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Abstract 
In this paper we consider an argument that is very influential in the philo-
sophical literature, the argument from causal role against the view that delu-
sions are beliefs. The argument has two premises, that many delusions fail to 
play belief-roles and that playing belief-roles is necessary for a mental state to 
be a belief. We assess both premises and suggest that they can be resisted. 
Keywords: delusions; beliefs; double bookkeeping; motivation; teleo-functio-
nalism. 
 
Introduction 
Doxasticism about delusion, “doxasticism” hereafter, is the claim that delu-
sions are beliefs. Delusions are usually regarded as beliefs in psychiatry. For 
instance, in the DSM-5 delusion is defined as a "false belief based on incorrect 
inference about external reality that is firmly held despite what almost every-
one else believes and despite what constitutes incontrovertible and obvious 
proof or evidence to the contrary" (American Psychiatric Association 2013: 
819). Moreover, cognitive scientists working on theories of delusion formation 
assume that the mechanisms responsible for the formation of delusions are 
also the mechanisms responsible for the formation of beliefs (Coltheart 2007; 
Corlett et al. 2010). 
However, doxasticism is not very popular among philosophers. Greg Currie 
and colleagues (Currie 2000; Currie and Jureidini 2001) argue that delusions 
are not beliefs but imaginings. Andy Egan (2009) thinks that they are “bimagi-
nations” (i.e. they are the states with some belief-like features and some imag-
ination-like features). Eric Schwitzgebel (2012) suggests that they are “in-
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between beliefs” (i.e. they are not beliefs, but not non-beliefs). Jakob Hohwy 
and colleagues (Hohwy and Rosenberg 2005; Hohwy and Rajan 2012) propose 
that they are perceptual inferences. 
The main argument against doxasticism is what we call “the argument from 
causal role” and what Tim Bayne (2010) calls “the functional role objection.” 
We believe that the argument is, at best, wanting despite its numerous sup-
porters within philosophy. The aim of this paper is to show some of the limita-
tions of the argument from causal role. Doxasticism and the argument from 
causal role will be introduced in Section 1. The argument has two premises; 
premise (1) says that many delusions fail to play belief-roles, and premise (2) 
says that playing belief-roles is necessary for a mental state to be a belief. 
Premise (1) and premise (2) are critically examined in Sections 2 and 3 respec-
tively. Our conclusion will be that both premises can be resisted.  
  
1. Doxasticism and the Argument from Causal Role 
 Delusions are beliefs, according to doxasticism. There are some prima facie 
reasons for this claim. 
   (1) People with delusions sincerely assert the content of their delusions. This 
gives a prima facie reason for doxasticism, since a person’s sincere asserting 
that P gives us a prima facie reason to think that she believes that P. If a per-
son does not believe that P, but, for instance, merely imagines that P, then 
why does she sincerely assert that P? We do not usually sincerely assert that P 
when we merely imagine that P.  
   (2) People with delusions typically regard their delusions as beliefs, which is 
another prima facie reason for doxasticism. LA-O, a woman with anosognosia 
(denial of illness), denies that her left hand belongs to her (Bisiach and Gemi-
niani 1991). If we ask LA-O: “Do you believe that the left hand doesn’t belong 
to you?” she will definitely say “Yes, I do believe it.” She will not say, for in-
stance, “No, I don’t. I am just imagining it.” Although self-reports of mental 
states are fallible, it would be fair to assume that they give prima facie rea-
sons.  
   (3) Delusions are regarded as beliefs not only by people reporting delusions, 
but also by psychiatrists. In introductory psychiatry textbooks and research 
papers, delusions are usually described as beliefs (Berrios 1991 is a notable 
exception). In general, when x, who knows y well (y’s behaviour, preferences, 
value, etc.), judges that y believes that P, then it gives a prima facie reason to 
think that y believes that P. In our case, many psychiatrists, who know people 
with delusions well, judge that their patients believe the content 
of their delusions. This gives us a prima facie reason to think that delusions 
are beliefs. 
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   (4) Delusions are a pathological phenomenon and the truth of doxasticism 
seems to be part of the reason why delusions are pathological. For instance, 
LA-O’s mental condition is pathological partly because she seriously denies 
that her left hand belongs to her. If she did not believe it, but merely imagined 
it, there would not be anything particularly pathological about her condition, 
as acts of imagination do not necessarily reflect how things are for the person 
engaging in the imagining. It is a strange thing for LA-O to imagine that her 
left hand does not belong to her, but we can easily entertain various kinds of 
strange possibilities in our imagination without losing mental health.  
   (5) Doxasticism helps us make sense of the distinction between delusions 
and other pathological mental phenomena. First, one can distinguish delusion 
from hallucination by saying that the former is a belief, while the latter is a 
perceptual state. In fact, this is the normal way in which psychiatry textbooks 
introduce the distinction between them. Second, doxasticism helps us make 
sense of the distinction between delusion and some linguistic disorders such 
as jargon aphasia. People with jargon aphasia make strange utterances due to 
linguistic impairments. In contrast, LA-O makes strange claims, such as “This 
is not my hand, but someone else’s!” not because of linguistic impairments, 
but because of the fact that she really believes strange things. Doxasticism 
might also enable us to make sense of the distinction between delusion and 
obsessive thought. People with obsessive thoughts about contamination by 
germs have more acute awareness of the strangeness of their thoughts than 
people with delusions, and this supports the view that they do not actually 
believe that they have been contaminated.  
Despite of these prima facie reasons, there are some philosophical arguments 
against doxasticism. Among others, the following seems to be playing the cen-
tral role in recent debates.  
Argument from Causal Role 
(1) Many delusions fail to play belief-roles. 
(2) A mental state is a belief only if it plays belief-roles. 
(3) Therefore, many delusions are not beliefs. 
Here, "belief-roles" refers to causal roles that are distinctively belief-like. 
Premise (2) is entailed by functionalistic theories of belief, including standard 
functionalism (i.e. to believe is to be in a state that plays belief-roles), standard 
representationalism (to believe is to have a representation that plays belief- 
roles), and dispositionalism (to believe is to have some belief-like disposi-
tions). Eric Schwitzgebel (2012) calls them “token-functionalisms.” They are 
token functionalisms because according to them every single token of a belief-
type needs to play belief-roles. Anti-doxastic philosophers tend to accept one 
of these theories. For instance, Currie and colleagues, Egan, and Schwitzgebel 
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accept standard functionalism, standard representationalism, and disposi-
tionalism respectively. 
Premise (1) is supported by clinical observations. It is commonly assumed that 
playing belief-roles includes being more or less sensitive to evidence, being 
more or less coherent with other beliefs, guiding action, and causing appro-
priate affective responses. What clinical observations often reveal is that de-
lusions lack these features.  
First, delusions do not easily respond to evidence. This is usually regarded as 
an essential, definitional feature of delusion. For instance, the earlier quote 
from the DSM-5 says that delusion “is firmly held despite what almost every-
one else believes and despite what constitutes incontrovertible and obvious 
proof or evidence to the contrary.”  
Second, delusions often fail to be coherent with non-delusional beliefs and 
commitments. For instance, a young woman with Cotard delusion, LU, was 
committed to the idea that she was dead, although she recognized that dead 
people cannot move and talk (McKay and Cipolotti 2007).  
Third, delusions sometimes fail to guide action. As Stone and Young put it, 
[…] although in some cases of Capgras delusions patients act in ways that 
seem appropriate to their beliefs, in many other cases one finds a curious 
asynchrony between the firmly stated delusional belief and actions one 
might reasonably expect to have followed from it. […] This failure to 
maintain a close co-ordination of beliefs and actions may be typical of the 
delusions that can follow brain injury. (Stone and Young 1997: 334) 
Fourth, delusions sometimes fail to cause appropriate affective responses. For 
instance, a man with Capgras delusion, who believed that his wife had been 
replaced by a “double”, never became hostile or aggressive to the “double”, 
but rather treated her in a very gentle manner, showing some positive affec-
tive feelings (Lucchelli and Spinnler 2007).  
Those clinical observations are certainly important, but should not be exag-
gerated. It is not the case that all delusions have all of the features above. For 
instance, a delusion might be irresponsive to evidence, but guide action. Peo-
ple with Capgras delusion who report that their loved ones are replaced by 
imposters can act violently towards the “imposters” and harm or even kill 
them (Silva et al. 1994). Some delusions show none of the features above and 
seem to behave just like paradigmatic beliefs. For instance, some persecutory 
delusions impact on people’s cognitive and affective life, are not obviously 
disconfirmed by the available evidence, lead to action, and seem to be in a 
relation of mutual support with some non-delusional beliefs (Payne 1992). 
Even if delusions have some of the features above, it does not mean that they 
are different from paradigmatic beliefs in the relevant aspects. For instance, 
some delusions fail to guide action. Still, those delusions are typically reflected 
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in appropriate verbal behaviour. In other words, people with delusions ver-
bally behave as if they seriously believe the content of their delusions. 
In the rest of the paper, we shall examine how good the causal role argument 
actually is. We shall discuss premise (1) and premise (2) in Section 2 and 
3 respectively.  
  
2. Examining Premise (1)  
Premise (1) says that many delusions fail to play belief-roles. In this section, 
we shall consider whether the premise is sound, focusing on the relationship 
between beliefs and action. 
  
2.1. Do delusions really fail to guide action? 
The most influential claim in support of premise (1) is that delusions fail to 
guide action in the relevant circumstances. This phenomenon is described and 
accounted for in different ways. In the context of schizophrenia, people with 
delusions are charged with “double bookkeeping” (Sass 2001; Gallagher 2009). 
Keith Frankish (2009) talks about “behavioural inertness” as the relative lack 
of influence that certain professed beliefs have on behaviour. 
The notion of double bookkeeping suggests that people with delusions are 
simultaneously committed to their delusional report and to a non-delusional 
belief, which conflicts with their delusional report. An example would be that 
of a person with Cotard delusion (like LU in the case studied by McKay and 
Cipolotti 2007) who asserts sincerely that she is dead, but at the same time 
does not find it surprising that she can move and talk. One version of the dou-
ble bookkeeping view is endorsed by Shaun Gallagher (2009). He argues that 
the person with delusions inhabits multiple realities at the same time, that is, 
the delusional reality where the delusional report is genuinely endorsed and 
the actual reality where the delusional report is at some level recognised as 
false. For instance, in the patient’s delusional reality it is true for him that the 
hospital nurses are attempting to poison him, but in his actual reality he real-
ises that the nurses pose no threat—and his behaviour is consistent with the 
actual reality as the patient eats the food the nurses give him.  
Similarly, the notion of behavioural inertness is about the delusion failing to 
give rise to the actions we would expect a person to initiate if she did genuine-
ly believe the content of her delusion. Relying on a dual-process theory of the 
mind, Keith Frankish (2009; 2012) likens delusions to acceptances rather than 
beliefs, where acceptances are policies the person openly endorses but would 
not be ascribed to the person on the basis of her observable behaviour. The 
person with Capgras delusion who claims that his wife has been replaced by 
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an impostor but shows affection to the alleged impostor (Lucchelli and 
Spinnler 2007) seems to exemplify behavioural inertness. An external observ-
er would not ascribe to the person the belief that his wife has been replaced 
by an impostor. 
But not all cases of delusions illustrate double bookkeeping or behavioural 
inertness. We should not forget that delusions are diagnosed on the basis of 
their behavioural manifestations, including stress, depression, preoccupation, 
social withdrawal, and impaired functioning more generally. In some cases, 
behavioural manifestations are specific to a type of delusion and dictated by 
its content: for instance, in persecutory delusions people manifest “safety be-
haviours”, that is, they avoid situations that they perceive as threatening given 
their delusions, and they are emotionally distressed with respect to the con-
tent of their delusions (Freeman, Garety and Kuipers 2001).  
There are also circumstances in which people behave in accordance with their 
delusions even though the ensuing actions have very significant costs associ-
ated with them. Here are some examples. Affected by perceptual delusional 
bicephaly, the delusion that one has two heads, a man who believed that the 
second head belonged to his wife’s gynaecologist attempted to attack it with 
an axe. When the attack failed he attempted it to shoot it and as a conse-
quence he was hospitalised with gunshot wounds (Ames 1984). A man who 
believed that a lizard was inside his body due to the scaly appearance of his 
skin tried to remove the lizard with a knife, harming himself as a result 
(Browning and Jones 1988). Some people with Cotard delusion remain motion-
less, refuse to eat or wash, and even speak in sepulchral tones (Wein-
stein 1996). 
To sum up, there are cases in which delusions fail to guide action, and cases in 
which they drive (specific and costly) actions. Where does this leave us with 
respect to premise (1)?  
 
2.2. The role of motivation 
Several strategies to explain the apparently conflicting evidence have been 
attempted, but here we want to put some pressure on the claim that delusions 
fail to influence or drive action because people lack doxastic commitment to 
the content of the delusions. We do so by referring to the hypothesis that dou-
ble bookkeeping and behavioural inertness are due to a failure of supporting 
the motivation to act. This is plausible because schizophrenia negatively im-
pacts on motivation (Bortolotti 2010; Bortolotti and Broome 2012). 
In the debate about the nature of delusions, philosophers impressed by the 
argument from causal role have not paid much attention to motivation either 
in the generation of an intention to act given a certain belief, or in the conver-
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sion of an intention into an action. Put simply, the suggestion is that one of the 
reasons why in some circumstances delusions fail to give rise to appropriate 
action is that the person genuinely believes the content of the delusions, but 
cannot acquire or sustain the motivation to act on it. Lack of motivation can 
inhibit action in paradigmatic beliefs, but there are very good reasons to sup-
pose that in the case of people with delusions the factors undermining motiva-
tion are much more powerful. At least in delusions emerging in the context of 
schizophrenia, motivation is adversely affected for a variety of reasons, in-
cluding widespread co-morbidity with depression (Siris 1995), flat affect, neu-
ropsychological deficits, emotional disturbances, and lack of support from the 
social and physical environment in which the agent finds herself.  
How would these factors impact on the observed inconsistencies between 
delusional reports and behaviour? First, intentions to act may not be generat-
ed due to conflicting attitudes towards the content of the delusion that give 
rise to incompatible goals and paralyse action. Second, relevant and appro-
priate goals may be initially identified, but become inaccessible at a later stage 
due to a deficit in meta-representation, such as limitations in imagination and 
projection—Chris Frith (1992) calls this poverty of action. Third, fluctuating 
conviction in the content of the delusion may undermine the stability of the 
person’s goals.  
Moreover, even when the intention to act is generated and the person’s goals 
preserve stability, other factors may interfere, and this applies to a population 
with schizophrenia more than to non-clinical or other clinical populations. 
For instance, there may be no appropriate emotional reaction towards the 
goal, and thus the goal may not be found sufficiently desirable to lead to ac-
tion (Gard et al. 2007; Kring and Elis 2013). More generally, the emotions that 
would support relevant action are disturbed due to stress and anxiety (Free-
man and Garety 2003; Freeman, Garety and Kuipers 2001). In addition, due to 
a reduced sense of self-efficacy and competence, and a reduced sense of au-
tonomy (both very common in schizophrenia), the person can lose confidence 
in her ability to achieve the relevant goals and doubt her capacity to carry out 
the relevant actions (Ryan and Deci 2010). 
Finally, the impact of the external environment on the person’s motivation to 
act on her delusion should not be underestimated. Plausibly, for a person who 
often experiences isolation, there are fewer opportunities to engage in activi-
ties that would promote the pursuit of her goals and fewer social incentives to 
act, given that the people surrounding her would not be supportive of the de-
lusion and the actions that would ensue from it. Also, we should not forget 
that, given the absurd content of some delusions, acting consistently with the 
delusion is often not possible (a person with Cotard delusion can act dead, but 
she will not succeed in behaving as if she were dead). 
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Examining the role of motivation in the case of delusions in schizophrenia 
may further persuade us that premise (1) does not warrant anti-doxastic ac-
counts of delusions, even if we were to embrace premise (2). It seems to us 
that some of the initial plausibility of premise (1) is due to the claim that peo-
ple do not act on their delusions. Thus delusions fail to play the most central 
of all belief-roles, that which distinguishes beliefs from other mental states, 
i.e. the capacity to influence behaviour and drive action. But the claim that 
people do not act on their delusions is unwarranted when we consider the 
clinical evidence available to us. Even when we acknowledge that people do 
not behave in the way we would expect if they genuinely believed the content 
of their delusion, philosophers have underestimated how inaction or incon-
sistent behaviour may be due to factors that undermine motivation in schizo-
phrenia and possibly other disorders of which delusions are a symptom. 
Premise (1) works within the argument from causal role only if we assume 
that the best explanation for a delusion failing to play an action-guiding role is 
that the person does not genuinely believe the content of the delusion. There 
are other explanations for failure of action guidance. The role of belief is to 
guide action in conjunction with the right kind of motivation. If the capacity to 
acquire or preserve motivation is compromised in schizophrenia, then it is 
not surprising that delusions may fail to guide action, even if they are be-
lief states.  
 
2.3. Interim conclusions 
Glenn Roberts reminds us of the continuity between delusional reports and 
belief reports: 
It is also worth emphasising that irrational beliefs are by no means lim-
ited to the deluded. […] Rachman (1983) has demonstrated the propensity 
for ‘normals’ to produce irrational thinking and form false conclusions 
from the available information. He gives a vivid picture of the occurrence 
of cognitive illusions which are strenuously defended as true, even when 
the subjects are informed that they are false, and he summarises the bi-
ases found in cognitive studies of otherwise normal subjects. Similarly, 
Rothstein (1980) traces the distortion of scientific theories by irrational 
elements introduced through the ‘narcissistic investment’ of the theorists 
in their own creations. This may be directly comparable with the rela-
tionship the deluded have with their beliefs. He says that when the nar-
cissistically invested theory is challenged, it is characteristically defended 
by “devising numerous articulations and ad hoc modifications in order to 
eliminate any apparent conflict. As such it assuages his sense of vulnera-
bility and helplessness.” (Roberts 1992: 304) 
We believe that the described continuity between delusions and non-
delusional beliefs also extends to the way in which reported attitudes are 
manifested in behaviour and lead to action. Contrary to the spirit, if not the 
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letter, of the argument from causal role, we suggest here that we should think 
about delusions and action in the same way we think about beliefs and action. 
Rational agents have beliefs that are not shaped by their desires, are well-
supported by evidence, do not conflict with their other beliefs, and drive ac-
tion in a consistent way. But rational agents are sparse both in the clinical and 
non-clinical population. Actual agents can be subject to positive illusions or 
self-deception when they form beliefs that fill an emotional need or play a 
defensive function. They have beliefs that are sensitive to evidence only some 
of the time and tend to strenuously defend previously endorsed beliefs in the 
face of counterevidence. They have beliefs that can and often do conflict with 
some of their other beliefs as we see from the literature on cognitive disso-
nance and preference reversals. Most important to us, actual agents do not 
consistently act on their beliefs.  
Accepting a more psychologically realistic account of what agents can do will 
reduce the perceived gulf between people with delusions and people without, 
and will also contribute to deflating some popular arguments against doxasti-
cism, including the argument from causal role. 
 
3. Examining Premise (2)  
Premise (2) says that a mental state is a belief only if it plays belief-roles. This 
is a consequence of token-functionalisms. In this section, we consider two 
questions. First, are there any good arguments for (2)? Second, are here any 
good alternatives to token-functionalisms that do not entail (2)? We shall an-
swer the first question negatively and the second question positively. In other 
words, there is no good argument for premise (2) and there is at least a good 
alternative theory that does not entail (2). We take them to show that premise 
(2) can be resisted.  
 
3.1. Any arguments for (2)? 
Let us call the possibility of beliefs without belief-roles “multiple-
functionability of belief”. In this terminology, premise (2) says that belief is 
not multiply-functionable. Now, are there any good arguments against the 
multiple-functionability of belief?  
A possible argument against multiple-functionability of belief would go like 
this: How can we identify beliefs without belief-roles as beliefs? How can we 
know that they are beliefs? We usually figure out what mental states people 
are in by looking at their causes and effects. For instance, we come to think 
that one believes that it is raining outside on the basis of the fact that one be-
haves as if it is the case that it is raining outside. If there are some beliefs 
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without belief-roles, then we will have serious troubles in identifying them 
as beliefs. 
However, this argument is not very compelling. We usually know the temper-
ature of a room by looking at the thermometer in the room. When the tem-
perature of the room fails to have the right kind of impact on the thermome-
ter’s readings (because, for instance, the thermometer is broken), it will be 
difficult to know the temperature. But nobody takes this to show that it is es-
sential for the temperature of the room that it has a right kind of impact on 
the thermometer’s readings. Now, certainly, if some beliefs fail to play belief-
roles, then it would be difficult to identify them as beliefs. But it would not 
show that it is essential for beliefs that they play belief-roles any more than in 
the case of thermometer (Sober 1985).  
Here is another argument. One might think that the multiple-realisability ar-
gument, which is the standard argument for functionalism, rules out the mul-
tiple-realisability of mental states. Beliefs seem to be multiply-realisable. After 
all, we do not deny beliefs to some non-human creatures just because those 
creatures are neurophysiologically different from us. But then it looks as 
though the only thing that is shared by all beliefs is the fact that they play the 
same kind of causal roles, namely, belief-roles. Thus, beliefs would simply be 
regarded as the mental states with belief-roles.  
However, this argument fails. The multiple-realisability does not rule out mul-
tiple-functionability, because there might be some theories of mental states 
that allow for multiple-realisability and multiple-functionability at the same 
time. For instance, David Lewis (1983) proposed such a theory. Lewis believes 
that pain is multiply-realisable because a Martian, who is neurophysiological-
ly different from us, can be in pain. He also thinks that pain is multiply-
functionable because a guy whose pain does not play pain-roles can be in 
pain. According to Lewis, a successful theory of pain needs to allow for the 
multiple-realisability and multiple-functionability of pain at the same time. 
Lewis’s proposal is this: 
 x feels pain iff x is in a physical state of the type whose tokens statistically-
normally play pain-roles in the appropriate population to which x belongs. 
The theory certainly allows for those possibilities. First, the Martian can be in 
pain because it is perfectly possible that he is in a physical state of the type 
whose tokens statistically-normally play pain-roles in his population. Maybe 
the Martian has some inflated cavities in his hydraulic brain, and inflated 
cavities statistically-normally play pain-roles in the Martian population. Sec-
ond, the mad guy can be in pain because it is perfectly possible that he is in a 
physical state of the type whose tokens statistically-normally play pain-roles 
in his population. Maybe the mad guy has some firing C-fibres in his head, and 
C-fibre firing statistically-normally play pain-roles in the human population. It 
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is not our claim here that this is a good theory of pain. The point of this is 
merely to illustrate that multiple-realisability is perfectly compatible with 
multiple-functionability.  
 
3.2. An alternative theory of belief 
Are there any independently motivated theories of belief that do not entail 
premise (2)? In other words, are there any independently motivated theories 
that allow for multiple-functionability of belief? There are several candidates 
(e.g. an application of Lewis’s theory to beliefs), but we focus on one in partic-
ular.  
Peter Godfrey-Smith introduces a useful distinction between two basic forms 
of functionalism: 
Most recent philosophy of mind has been “functionalist” in some sense or 
other. We can distinguish two basic forms of functionalism in philosophy of 
mind. First, there is the more orthodox view which I will call “dry functional-
ism.” This view understands function in terms of causal role, and it identifies 
mental states in terms of their typical causal relation to sensory inputs, other 
mental states, and behavioral outputs. Second there is “teleo-functionalism.” 
The view makes use of a richer, biological concept of function more closely 
allied to traditional teleological notions, a concept often analyzed with the 
aid of evolutionary history. For the dry functionalists, one essential property 
of any mental state is the pattern of behavioral outputs which the state, in 
conjunction with the rest of the system, tends to cause in various circum-
stances. For the teleo-functionalists, what is essential to the mental state is 
not what it tends to do but what it is supposed to do. (Godfrey-Smith 1998: 13) 
According to dry functionalism, mental states are defined by the causal roles 
they play. Beliefs, for example, are the mental states that play (or tend to play) 
belief-roles. This basically corresponds to token-functionalism in Schwitz-
gebel’s terminology. According to teleo-functionalism, on the other hand, 
mental states are defined by the etiological functions they have. Beliefs, for 
example, are the mental states that have distinctively belief-like etiological 
functions. Let us call them “doxastic functions.” Etiological functions of some-
thing are determined by their evolutionary history. To have a certain etiologi-
cal function is to have a certain evolutionary history. For example, a very 
simple definition of etiological function is that x has the etiological function of 
doing F just in case the ancestors of x were selected for doing F. (Although the 
definition can be complicated in several different ways, those complications 
are not directly relevant in our discussion.)  
A number of philosophers defended teleo-functionalist theories for various 
theoretical reasons (Lycan 1987; Sober 1985; Sterelny 1990): (1) teleo-
functionalism can deal with some counterexamples to token functionalism; (2) 
teleo-functionalism is more promising in accounting for consciousness than 
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token functionalism; (3) teleo-functionalism is more consistent than token 
functionalism with the function-analytic explanatory strategy which is widely 
used in psychology. Relatedly, teleosemantics is arguably the most influential 
naturalistic account of the content of mental states (Dretske 1986; Millikan 
1984). The core idea of teleosemantics is that the possibility of misrepresenta-
tion can be explained naturalistically in terms of the possibility of the failure 
of etiological functions. Although teleosemantics is a theory about the content 
as opposed to attitude (which we are interested in here) of beliefs, the sup-
porters of the view sometimes blur the distinction between them. For exam-
ple, Ruth Millikan writes: “[The] content of the representation turns out to be 
an abstraction from a fuller affair intrinsically involving an imbedding mood 
or propositional attitude. Put simply, there is no such thing as content without 
mood or attitude; content is an aspect of attitude” (Millikan 1995: 155). The 
teleo-functionalist definition of mental states can also be seen in empirical 
literature. For instance, Randolph Nesse defines emotions as “specialized 
modes of operation shaped by natural selection to adjust the physiological, 
psychological, and behavioral parameters of an organism in ways that in-
crease its capacity and tendency to respond adaptively to the threats and op-
portunities characteristic of specific kinds of situations” (Nesse 1990: 268). 
A feature of teleo-functionalism about beliefs is that it allows for the multiple-
functionability of beliefs. Teleo-functionalism defines beliefs in terms of dox-
astic functions and to have doxastic functions is to have a certain evolutionary 
history. Thus, in effect, teleo-functionalism defines beliefs in terms of their 
evolutionary history. A consequence of this is that playing belief-roles is not 
necessary for a mental state to be a belief. Playing particular causal roles is 
not necessary in order to have a certain evolutionary history. Here is an anal-
ogous case. One might define kidneys in terms of their etiological function, 
namely, filtering metabolic wastes from blood. To have the function of filter-
ing metabolic wastes from blood is, again, to have a certain evolutionary his-
tory. Thus, in effect, this definition characterises kidneys in terms of their evo-
lutionary history. A consequence of this is that actual or dispositional perfor-
mances are irrelevant for an item to be a kidney. This rightly allows for the 
possibility of malfunctioning kidneys, namely, kidneys that fail to filter meta-
bolic wastes from blood. 
“Doxastic functions” is just a placeholder notion. Here we only provide a very 
rough idea about what doxastic functions are, relying on Frank Ramsey's 
(1931) famous idea that a belief is a "map of neighbouring space by which we 
steer." On the one hand, Ramsey says that a belief is a "map", which suggests 
that beliefs, just like maps, are supposed to represent facts more or less accu-
rately. On the other hand, he also says that "we steer by" beliefs, which sug-
gests that beliefs are supposed to guide our actions. According to what we call 
the "Ramseyan account", doxastic functions are the functions of (more or less) 
accurate representing and action guiding. Beliefs, therefore, are the mental 
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states with the functions of accurate representing and action guiding. The 
Ramseyan account of doxastic functions is probably too simplistic. It needs to 
be revised in several ways. For example, there would be some types of beliefs 
whose evolutionary value has little to do with accuracy (McKay and Dennett 
2009). However, we shall simply leave this issue open since the perfect under-
standing of doxastic functions is not essential for our purpose. What is crucial 
here is that teleo-functionalism does allow for the multiple-functionability of 
beliefs, whatever doxastic functions are.  
Teleo-functionalism allows for the multiple-functionability of beliefs. Even if 
delusions fail to play belief-roles, on this view they could be beliefs because 
nothing yet rules out the possibility that they have doxastic functions. Thus, 
there is at least an independently motivated theory of belief that does not en-
tail premise (2). But, here is a further question. Do we have reasons to believe 
that delusions are in fact beliefs according to teleo-functionalism? In other 
words, do we have reasons to believe that delusions in fact have doxastic 
functions? This, we believe, is an open empirical issue. In the following, we 
provide a way in which we can approach this issue with the help of (future) 
relevant empirical findings. 
So far, we have assumed that etiological functions can be attributed to beliefs. 
The assumption is in fact problematic since etiological functions are attribut-
ed only to the items that were selected in the past. In most cases, mental states 
such as beliefs are not the products of natural selection. As Godfrey-Smith 
pointed out, “[s]tructural features of the visual apparatus are products of an 
evolutionary history, a history of heritable variation in fitness. But, states of 
visual system are not the right sort of things to have such a history” (Godfrey-
Smith 1989: 542). The problem can be fixed by attributing functions to mental 
states in an indirect way. The idea is that all the talk about the functions of 
mental states is translated into a talk about the functions of the mechanisms 
that produce and consume those states. In turn, the functions of those mecha-
nisms are defined in terms of their evolutionary history (Millikan 1984). For 
example, the statement that a mental state has the function of accurate repre-
senting is translated into the statement that its producer mechanisms have the 
function of producing accurate representations. And, this statement is cashed 
out in terms of the evolutionary history of the mechanisms: the ancestors of 
the mechanisms were selected for producing accurate representations in 
the past. 
The statement that a mental state has doxastic functions is, thus, translated 
into a statement about the producers and the consumers of the state having 
some corresponding functions. Let us call the functions that are attributed to 
the producer and consumer mechanisms “doxastic producer functions” and 
“doxastic consumer functions” respectively. For instance, if accurate repre-
senting is one of the doxastic functions, then producing accurate representa-
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tions is one of the doxastic producer functions. Now, our target hypothesis is 
that delusions have doxastic functions. The hypothesis is translated into the 
following: Delusions are produced by mechanisms with doxastic producer func-
tions and consumed by mechanisms with doxastic consumer functions. Let us 
call this “doxastic mechanisms hypothesis” (DMH). What is nice about DMH 
is that, on the one hand, it is equivalent to our target hypothesis and, on 
the other hand, we can examine its truth once we know (a) the mechanisms 
that produce and consume delusional states and (b) the functions of 
those mechanisms.   
According to teleo-functionalism, paradigmatic beliefs, such as my belief that 
there is a cup of tea on the table, have doxastic functions. (Or, more precisely, 
“doxastic functions” are fixed by the etiological functions that those paradig-
matic beliefs have.) This means that paradigmatic beliefs are produced by 
mechanisms with doxastic producer functions and consumed by mechanisms 
with doxastic consumer functions. Then, if we can show that delusions are (a) 
produced by exactly the same mechanisms that produce paradigmatic beliefs 
and (b) consumed by exactly the same mechanisms that consume paradigmatic 
beliefs, then we in effect show that DMH is correct. Let us call (a) and (b) 
“same producer hypothesis” (SPH) and “same consumer hypothesis” (SCH) 
respectively. Please note that, for instance, SPH does not say that there is no 
difference between the producers of paradigmatic beliefs and those of delu-
sions. It is certainly possible that paradigmatic beliefs are produced by mech-
anisms that are intact, while delusions are produced by mechanisms that are 
malfunctioning. SPH does not deny this. It rather says that those mechanisms 
are nonetheless the same mechanisms for the same reason that healthy kid-
neys and malfunctioning ones are the same organs. The same thing is true 
about SCH.  
Now, we do not have enough empirical knowledge yet to come to a definite 
conclusion about these hypotheses. Still, it would be fair to say that SPH is 
very likely to be true in light of what we already know about the delusion 
formation process. Arguably, one of the mechanisms that are responsible for 
the production of paradigmatic beliefs is the one that outputs beliefs in re-
sponse to perceptual or experiential inputs. The current empirical literature 
strongly suggests that delusions are also formed by such a mechanism. “Em-
piricism about delusions” is the view that delusions are formed in response to 
some kind of abnormal experience. A delusion might arise as the endorse-
ment of the content of abnormal experience (endorsement version of empiri-
cism) or the explanation of it (explanation version of empiricism). Empiricism 
is well supported by evidence, especially when applied to monothematic delu-
sions. Capgras delusion is probably the most famous example. Hadyn Ellis and 
Andrew Young (1990) propose the very influential hypothesis that Capgras 
delusion arises from a deficit in face processing involving loss of affective 
responses to familiar faces. This deficit is hypothesised as being caused by the 
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disrupted connection between the face recognition system and the autonomic 
nervous system. This hypothesis is supported by the finding that people with 
Capgras delusions have a reduced galvanic skin response to faces and do not 
show asymmetrical responses between familiar and unfamiliar faces (Ellis et 
al. 1997).  
One might think that empiricism is not very plausible when it comes to typical 
delusions in the context of schizophrenia such as persecutory delusion or de-
lusion of reference. However, this is probably not the case. Shitij Kapur (2003) 
proposes an influential empiricist account of delusions in schizophrenia. He 
argues that the abnormality in dopamine transmission in schizophrenia leads 
to an inappropriate attribution of salience, where “salience” refers to, rough-
ly, the attention-grabbing quality of events. When salience is attributed inap-
propriately to events that are not very interesting as a matter of fact, they 
grab special attention. Such events, all of a sudden, seem to be important and 
are invested with special meaning. This hypothesis is coherent with the fact 
that many people with delusions in the context of schizophrenia report that 
some events have “special meaning” for them, that they have an “altered ex-
perience” of the world, that their awareness is “sharpened”, and so on. The 
delusion, according to Kapur, is produced in response to the experience of 
abnormal salience: “Delusions in this framework are a “top-down” cognitive 
explanation that the individual imposes on these experiences of aberrant sali-
ence in an effort to make sense of them” (Kapur 2003: 15). 
This account has recently turned into a more sophisticated theory which is 
often called “prediction-error theory” of delusions (Corlett et al. 2010; Fletcher 
and Frith 2009). The account assumes that the operation of the brain relies in 
part on the signals that tell us that what we experience does not match our 
predictions. The prediction-error signals indicate that the internal model of 
the world from which the predictions are derived is incorrect and needs to be 
updated. Prediction-error signals play a crucial role in, among others, allocat-
ing attention; we allocate attention to the events that defy our expectations. 
This makes sense intuitively since the predictable events do not bring any new 
information and, thus, do not deserve attention. According to prediction-error 
theory, due to prediction-error signalling abnormalities (or abnormal 
weighting of prediction errors), people with delusions allocate attention to 
events that do not actually deserve it. This is the process where uninteresting 
events become inappropriately salient, and delusions are produced as explan-
atory responses to the inappropriately salient events due to aberrant predic-
tion-error signals. This hypothesis is supported by the study by Phil Corlett 
and colleagues (2007) which suggests the existence of prediction-error signal-
ling abnormalities in people with delusions due to schizophrenia.  
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Now, these facts and theories suggest that SPH is true; delusions are produced 
by the same mechanisms that are responsible for the production of paradig-
matic beliefs (in response to experiential inputs). Of course, there could be a 
debate about whether or not that mechanism is working properly. Brendan 
Maher seems to be arguing that the mechanism is working properly in his 
famous statement: “a delusion is a hypothesis designed to explain unusual 
perceptual phenomena and developed through the operation of normal cogni-
tive processes” (Maher 1974: 103). On the other hand, Tony Stone and Andrew 
Young seem to be sceptical about this when they wrote: “the perceptual deficit 
account needs to be augmented by a theory of the reasoning biases that lead 
to the delusional interpretation of the perceptual anomalies produced by the 
perceptual deficit” (Stone and Young 1997: 341). In any case, the crucial point 
here is that delusions are produced by exactly the same mechanism (working 
properly or not) that is responsible for producing paradigmatic beliefs.  
 
4. Conclusion 
The argument from causal role, which is the most influential argument 
against doxasticism, depends on two premises. According to premise (1), 
many delusions fail to play belief-roles. According to premise (2), a mental 
state is a belief only if it plays belief-roles. The former is said to be supported 
by clinical observations. The latter seems to follow token-functionalist theo-
ries of belief. We argued, however, that both premises can in fact be resisted. 
Supporters of premise (1) tend to make two mistakes. Firstly, they tend to ide-
alise belief-roles in such a way that "playing belief-roles" is almost synony-
mous with “being a rational belief.” If we are committed to this idealisation of 
beliefs, it is not difficult to give good evidence for premise (1), because it can 
be easily shown that delusions are not rational beliefs. But the problem with 
idealising beliefs in this way is that many non-delusional beliefs would also 
fail to play belief-roles and, hence, we would need to accept anti-doxasticism 
about them too. And, if we are not committed to the idealisation of beliefs, 
then it is not obvious that clinical observations give good evidence for premise 
(1). Secondly, anti-doxasticists tend to argue that premise (1) is strongly sup-
ported by the fact that delusions sometimes fail to guide action. This argument 
ignores the possibility that failure of action guidance can be explained by hy-
potheses that are perfectly compatible with doxasticism. In particular, a co-
herent and empirically supported explanation of the failure to act on delu-
sions is that the capacity to acquire or preserve motivation is compromised in 
people with delusions, especially in the context of schizophrenia. 
Premise (2) can also be resisted. Firstly, we did not find any good argument 
for premise (2). The fact that belief is multiply-realisable does not support 
premise (2) because multiple-realisability is perfectly compatible with multi-
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ple-functionability. The fact that we usually identify beliefs by looking at their 
causes and effects does not support premise (2) because what the nature of 
belief is does not need to coincide with how we identify beliefs. Secondly, 
premise (2) is usually accepted by anti-doxastic philosophers simply because it 
is entailed by the token-functionalist theories they accept. However, there 
might be some alternative theories that do not entail premise (2). Teleo-
functionalism, according to which beliefs are the mental states with doxastic 
functions, seems to be an example. Given that there is at least one theory of 
belief with some independent motivations that does not entail premise (2), 
anti-doxasticists cannot assume the truth of premise (2) simply because it is 
entailed by their favourite theories. 
Of course, to show that the argument from causal role can be resisted is not to 
show that doxasticism is true. Doxasticists have more work to do. Doxasticists 
who resist premise (1), for instance, need to argue that the compromised mo-
tivation hypothesis is not just coherent, but is also more plausible than the 
alternative hypotheses favoured by anti-doxasticists. Doxasticists who resist 
premise (2) on the basis of teleo-functionalism need to show that teleo-
functionalism supports (and not just permits) doxasticism. To do so, they need 
to show that delusions have doxastic functions. We described a way in which 
thus could be done by mentioning relevant empirical findings. But we need to 
know more about the delusion formation process and the delusion consump-
tion process before we can reach a more definite conclusion. 
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